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A democratic revolt erupted in Thailand in summer 2020 against shrinking 
civic space due to persisting autocracy and COVID-19-related restrictions. 
At their peak, the youth-led demonstrations attracted almost 100,000 par-
ticipants whose demands targeted Thailand’s most sacred institution: the 
monarchy. The protests have fanned democratic aspirations in Southeast 
Asia, prompting many to celebrate the advent of a “Southeast Asian Spring.” 
 • Before the pandemic, Thailand had already wrestled with a hybrid regime that 
represses civic space. The regime has weaponised draconian laws to stifle dis-
sent, while unleashing disinformation campaigns to discredit the opposition. 
 • With the COVID-19 outbreak, opportunities for mass mobilisation have arisen. 
Despite the regime’s effective containment of the pandemic, its poor economic 
management and an absent monarch have fostered grievances conducive to 
mass protest.
 • From July to December 2020, diverse civic networks staged the largest and 
longest protests since the 2014 coup. Protesters drew on various tactical inno-
vations to push back against regime repression and voice democratic demands, 
including monarchy reform. 
 • Thailand’s protests have become a regional sensation by inspiring similar pro-
democracy struggles in Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia, and recently Myan-
mar. These protests largely responded to regime threats to civil society. 
 • Despite this regional spillover precipitating democratic optimism, Southeast 
Asian autocratic regimes remain resilient. Whether regional democratisation 
can transpire partly depends on civil societies’ strategic breakthroughs.
Policy Implications
As Thailand is a test case for pushback against a trend of shrinking civic space in 
Southeast Asia, European policymakers, aid agencies and political foundations 
can play a role in fostering a grassroots network of regional solidarity. They can 
work with emerging pan-Asian democratic alliances in order to strengthen ne-
cessary infrastructures and foster coordination across groups. For this support 
to be discreet, capacity-building activities that focus on knowledge exchange, 
networking, and collaboration could be less politically charged – thus avoiding 




German Institute for Global and 
Area Studies (GIGA)
Leibniz-Institut für Globale  
und Regionale Studien




   2    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 1 | FEBRUARY 2021 
Repressed Civic Space: Thailand’s Hybrid Regime and  
Tactics of Repression
After two episodes of military coup in 2006 and 2014, Thailand has plunged 
deeper into a military-palace-led autocracy that employs a myriad of tactics to 
repress the oppositional civil society. The military–monarchy nexus has domi-
nated the country’s political landscape despite brief democratic intervals in the 
1930s, 1970s, and 1990s. Particularly the 1990s democratic opening empowered 
new political forces, including the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party and its constituents 
in Thailand’s most impoverished regions. However, this rise distressed establish-
ment elites who then moved to depose the TRT-led government through the 2006 
military coup. 
This set the stage for a period of turbulence in which the establishment and 
anti-establishment camps engaged in tit-for-tat street protests to oppose gov-
ernments representing their respective antagonists in 2008, 2009–2010, and 
2013–2014. Led by staunch supporters of the establishment, the 2013–2014 mass 
demonstrations gave ground to the most recent military coup. The five years of 
military rule that followed uprooted what remained from the 1990s democratic 
opening, while ensuring the staying power of establishment elites. Armed with 
this confidence, the regime agreed to national elections in March 2019. Through 
constitutional and electoral manipulations, its proxy the Palang Pracharat Party 
outperformed the TRT-affiliated Pheu Thai Party electorally, and thus currently 
leading the ruling coalition. The Thai regime is, at present, hybrid. It harbours 
key features of competitive authoritarianism such as manipulated elections and 
aggrandised executive power through constitutional manoeuvre and influence 
over the Constitutional Court and Election Commission. Meanwhile, the incum-
bent retains some dictatorial modus operandi by preserving the senatorial quota 
for military commanders and employing extensive military power to stifle dis-
sent. 
These regime characteristics inform tactics of repression that, until mid-
2020, had successfully precluded large-scale anti-establishment demonstrations. 
First, the regime weaponises a host of draconian laws by charging leading dissi-
dents on several counts in an attempt to prevent effective anti-regime mobilisa-
tion. This tactical piling up of legal charges enables the police to detain activists 
in perpetuity: as soon as the court acquits an activist of one charge, the police 
would file another lawsuit to re-detain that individual. Meanwhile, dissidents 
facing multiple charges end up expending their time and money on a drawn-out 
judicial process. The tactic is also applied to ordinary citizens, whose low-profile 
activism such as sharing a Facebook post can carry serious penalties. The aim 
is to generate a “chilling effect” through what is known as the Strategic Lawsuit 
Against Public Participation. Draconian laws commonly used include Article 112 
of the Criminal Code on offence against the monarchy; Article 116 of the Criminal 
Code on sedition; Criminal Code, Sections 326 to 333 on defamation; Computer-
Related Crime Act or CCA; Emergency Decree (currently related to the COVID-19 
pandemic); and martial law (previously imposed after the 2014 coup) (Sombat-
poonsiri 2020).
Another tactic entails online surveillance and disinformation campaigns. On-
line surveillance works in tandem with weaponised draconian laws, especially 
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the CCA, which licenses the authorities to block Internet content threatening na-
tional security – and to punish those alleged to distribute it. In reality the CCA 
is often used against palace critics, thus interlinking online surveillance with a 
weaponised Article 112. In 2012, for instance, court orders effectively blocked 
more than 74,000 URLs considered royally offensive. Meanwhile, the authorities 
charged hundreds of Facebook users critical of the monarchy between 2014 and 
2018 (Human Rights Watch 2019). Facilitating such extensive lawsuits is an ar-
ray of cyber troops – from the police’s “Cyber Scouts” to the army’s Information 
Operation units – that monitor social media conversations day in, day out. Apart 
from surveillance, these units engage in state-sanctioned disinformation cam-
paigns that create and reinforce online messages favourable to the establishment 
and unfavourable to the opposition (Sombatpoonsiri 2021). 
The last key tactic regards the use of force. Although the regime increasingly 
opts for the “unarmed,” legal suppression of internal dissent, forced disappear-
ance remains common among activists in exile. Between 2014 and 2020, at least 
nine Thai activists who were charged under Article 112 and sought refuge in Cam-
bodia, Laos, and Vietnam went missing – with the bodies of two of them found 
floating in Laos’s Mekhong River, their stomachs stuffed with concrete (Reuters 
2019). The most recent such case concerned the disappearance of the 36-year-
old activist Wanchalerm Saksatsit in Cambodia that sparked questions regarding 
Article 112 and helped ignite mass demonstrations from July to December 2020.
COVID-19 and Protest Onset
The pandemic presents both a challenge and an opportunity for Thailand’s pro-
democracy groups. On the one hand, the regime would use the health crisis as a 
pretext for imposing the Emergency Decree on 26 March 2020 – renewed nine 
times as of February 2021. Accordingly, civic space is reduced as all types of pub-
lic gathering are banned; critics of the government response to the pandemic risk 
lawsuits. 
On the other hand, COVID-19 creates at least two structural opportunities for 
pro-democracy groups. First, although the Thai public health sector’s response to 
the pandemic has been effective, leading to a relatively low number of COVID-19 
cases (around 25,000 infections and 82 deaths as of 18 February 2021, out of a 
populace of 69 million), the regime has poorly managed the economic repercus-
sions of two related lockdowns (March–April 2020 and January–February 2021). 
As millions lost their jobs, the government aid provided to them would be seen as 
too little, too late – especially compared to its enthusiasm to save big businesses. 
In light of Thailand’s existing economic disparity, this different treatment of the 
“haves” and “have-nots” reinforces the perception of elite privilege. For young-
sters especially, economic inequality conducive to a lack of opportunities makes 
it seem that they do not have a bright future in Thailand. 
Second, the health and economic crises set the stage for public questioning 
of royal power. Different from his late father, King Bhumibol, whose moral image 
sustained royal legitimacy, King Vajiralongkorn’s departure from this path has 
started to raise eyebrows. At the centre of growing public criticism are his luxuri-
ous and eccentric lifestyle in Germany; his vast personal wealth (between EUR 24 
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and 57 million); and, the fiscal budget allocated to annual royal expenses (as of 
2020, EUR 35 million) (Weedon 2020). Pro-democracy activists link such wealth 
to increasing royal power, potentially undermining what is a constitutional mon-
archy. For them, democratic reform of the monarchy is deemed necessary for 
democratising the country at large. 
Mass Revolt and Pushbacks against Repressed Civic Space
Two events were the final straws triggering the 2020 mass protests. The first was 
the dissolution of the Future Forward Party (FFP). The party embodies the anti-
establishment camp, but is considered to be more vocal than the TRT in terms of 
its democratic agenda. While royalists portray the FFP as advocating for repub-
licanism, the younger generation associates it with a hopeful future. As such, the 
FFP attracted 6.3 million of a possible 53 million votes in the March 2019 elec-
tion. Anxious that it would threaten the status quo, the establishment decided the 
FFP had to go. In February 2020 the Constitutional Court disbanded the party 
for obscure reasons, sparking protest across more than 50 university campuses 
and high schools. 
The second trigger was the disappearance of Wanchalerm in July 2020. 
Soon after the news broke, social media campaigns called to #saveWanchalerm 
and #abolishArticle112. These small gatherings subsequently escalated into a 
larger political movement that demanded the government and authorities stop 
harassing citizens, plus amendment of the current constitution and reform of 
the monarchy. Corresponding with these demands was the three-finger salute 
protesters took from the Hollywood blockbuster The Hunger Games, being the 
anti-dictatorship symbol. Between July and December 2020, around 350 protest 
events erupted across Thailand, with major ones attracting between 20,000 and 
100,000 protest-goers. 
Through decentralised organisation, technological savviness, tactical creativ-
ity, as well as flexibility and nonviolent discipline, leading protesters could push 
back against repression and carve out a space for mass mobilisation. The 2020 
protests were “networked,” in the sense that diverse civic groups were loosely co-
ordinated while still retaining autonomy vis-à-vis initiating and designing protest 
actions. The organisational evolution of networked protests is threefold. First, 
in July 2020, different university clubs from Bangkok and regional campuses 
formed core organisers under the name “Free Youth” (Yaowachon plod-aek). By 
August 2020, second, diverse groups banded together in two movements: Free 
People (Prachachon plod-aek) and Thammasat University for Demonstration 
Group (Thammasat lae karn chumnum). This period saw broader participation 
by high school students, an LGBTQI network, artists, and labour unions. 
The third and last phase of organisational development started in mid-Octo-
ber 2020, when these two movements merged under the new title People’s Party 
(Khana Ratsadorn). Despite this seemingly unified structure, leading activists 
were multiple. When leading members were arrested, protest participants were 
encouraged to coordinate among themselves instead. This tactic proved effective 
after protesters interrupted a royal convoy on 14 October, with the detention of 
main organisers and the police dispersion of a follow-up gathering occurring the 
   5    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 1 | FEBRUARY 2021 
day after. Sustaining political momentum, remaining organisers announced that 
“we are all leaders today” – prompting individuals to organise events in conveni-
ent localities. Thanks to these autonomous protests, street dissent proliferated 
despite the police crackdown. 
Regarding technological savviness, the youth-led protests devised social me-
dia platforms to enhance mass mobilisation, circumvent repression, and influ-
ence public discourse. Home to more than six million Thai users, with most being 
in their 20s, female, and Korean pop fans, Twitter is young protesters’ primary 
choice of networking site. Particular hashtags were created to publicise events 
(e.g. #TagYourFriendsToJoinMob) and fundraise; galvanise ideas for “hip” and 
“cool” protest activities (e.g. #IdeasForMob); and, draw international attention 
to the protests (e.g. #WhatsHappeningInThailand). 
Twitter was especially useful in reversing the effect of repression. Upon ar-
rests of leading activists, Twitter users created hashtags such as #SaveRung (the 
name of a leading activist), calling for supporters to gather in front of the appro-
priate police stations to demand their release. This tactic might not have often 
led to the authorities immediately complying, but it capitalised on regime repres-
sion to increase publicity – creating a new opportunity for protest. Moreover, 
in response to state-sponsored online disinformation, a Twitter user started the 
account @IOwarningbotTH providing an ongoing list of accounts and hashtags 
suspected of being involved (Thomas, Beattie and Zhang 2020). 
Facilitated by decentralised organisation and technological savviness, move-
ments’ tactical creativity and flexibility enabled effective responses to the crack-
down. Protesters identified their activities as “flash mobs” – a short-lived but 
highly visible form of dissent. To achieve this, activists incorporate satire and 
urban pop culture into their protest actions to appear less controversial, and 
to bypass the ban on public assembly. For instance, in July 2020, the Bangkok 
metro pol itan authorities placed numerous flower pots around the Democracy 
Monument to obstruct mass gathering there. Activists responded by inviting 
 people to visit this urban flower garden, and collectively shouted “Such a beauti-
ful garden!” 10 times. By adapting the Japanese manga “Hamtaro,” high school 
students ran around in one public place as if they were hamsters (like the manga 
character) – thus claiming they were just jogging, not protesting. Elsewhere, crit-
ics of the monarchy could initially voice their concerns publicly in a protest event 
where they donned outfits to resemble characters from Harry Potter. 
Likewise, tactical flexibility was crucial especially in response to security 
forces’ crowd control. By monitoring protesters’ social media feeds, authorities 
could pursue the tactic of “kettling” – limiting large groups’ entrance to a des-
ignated protest site and dispersing the small crowd trapped inside. In response, 
protesters opted for the tactic of deception – modelled on Hong Kong activists’ 
“Be Water” approach. A few hours before an event was due to begin, organis-
ers would announce a change of venue or cancel altogether. Because most young 
protesters constantly checked their social media feeds, this sudden change did 
not create significant hassle; they could conveniently take public transport and 
head to a new venue, or roam a mall instead if the event got called off entirely. 
However, for the authorities this deception caused a headache. In the heavily 
congested traffic of Bangkok, oversized vehicles bussed in by the police usually 
failed to reach the newly announced venue before the flash mob was over. 
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Lastly, protesters’ general commitment to nonviolence contributed to sus-
taining the movements’ credibility throughout. Thailand’s divisive protests be-
tween 2006 and 2014 had partly been characterised by street clashes, which set 
the scene for two military interventions. Meeting these challenges, protesters 
sought to uphold nonviolent nature of their activities. First, “peacekeepers” were 
recruited to provide security checks at protest sites, form human chains during 
rallies, and to communicate with the authorities. When tensions between these 
peacekeepers and royalist supporters threatened to escalate into a street fight, 
key organisers decided to disband the peacekeeping units. Second, activists em-
ployed a wide range of nonviolent methods of persuasion and non-cooperation 
(Kri-aksorn 2020), while keeping at bay hot-headed protesters who sought to 
retaliate against the police. Emphasising that “nonviolent discipline” is key to 
winning over the general public, organisers sometimes called off certain activi-
ties potentially triggering street clashes. Through a series of trainings in strategic 
nonviolence, protesters developed unarmed responses to authorities’ use of water 
cannons and tear gas – including the repurposing of large inflatable yellow rub-
ber ducks as shields. 
Despite the merits of these tactical innovations, there remained challenges. In 
response to large-scale protests, the regime combined carrots and sticks by invok-
ing draconian laws – especially Article 112 – and offering to address protesters’ 
demands. Regarding the latter, a committee overseeing the constitutional amend-
ment was established in November 2020. However protesters viewed this as mere 
lip service, as most members of such a committee are pro-regime. The security 
forces tried the forcible dispersal of protests a few times, but it backfired. Even-
tually the regime mobilised royalist supporters, including the right-wing Thai 
Bhakdi group, to counter anti-establishment protesters. The latter were accord-
ingly caught up in a battle on two fronts. Without substantive armed repression or 
actual concession, the regime waited out the protests losing momentum – which 
they did in the run up to Christmas 2020. 
Regional Spillover of the Thai Protests
The protests would become a regional sensation by inspiring similar pro-
democracy struggles in Southeast Asia at large. Although seven of the total 11 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are identified as flawed 
democracies (with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam classified as authori-
tarian), a closer look at these regimes may indicate otherwise. That is, while elec-
tions might be held in Thailand and Singapore, the uneven playing field makes 
genuine contestation of dominant parties nearly impossible in both. Malaysia’s 
newly earned democracy proved short-lived as the ruling coalition that was once 
the opposition collapsed in 2020 in the face of old elites’ lingering leverage. Mean-
while, the quality of democracy in Indonesia and the Philippines is eroding as in-
cumbents consolidate their power at the expense of checks and balances. 
Many Southeast Asian regimes’ hostility towards civil society reflects this lack 
of democratic credentials. In 2020, civic space in Vietnam and Laos was identi-
fied as closed; in Brunei, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand as repressed; and, 
in the rest – East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore – as 
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obstructed (CIVICUS 2021). In most Southeast Asian countries, draconian laws – 
from defamation and sedition ones to various versions of cyber laws and the Anti-
Terror Act – are weaponised to strangle and criminalise oppositional civil socie-
ties. Meanwhile, non-governmental organization (NGO) laws have been imposed in 
Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and Vietnam to regulate and restrict their international 
funding. There is also reason to believe that recent incidents of the arrest and/or 
forced disappearance of activists exiled in Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Vietnam could not have transpired without interstate cooperation (Johnson and 
Wongcha-um 2019). 
Against this backdrop, a grassroots pro-democracy alliance is emerging in 
Southeast Asia and in Asia as a whole – with Thailand’s 2020 protests contribut-
ing thereto. Prior to the Thai demonstrations last year, #MilkTeaAlliance trended 
on Twitter in April 2020 as a pan-Asian democratic response to authoritarian en-
croachment. In 2019, Thai student activists organised solidarity protests for their 
Hong Kong peers and for Laotian activists. The Thai youth protests, with their in-
ternational hashtag #WhatsHappeningInThailand, sparked similar initiatives else-
where – especially in Laos, where #IfLaosPoliticsWasGood (replicating #IfThaiPol-
iticsWasGood) went viral. One Laotian digital activist thinks that “Laos can learn 
from Thailand. The Thai movement is creating inspiration for Laotians to stand up 
and ask for their rights” (Chia 2020). However, in the Communist Party-ruled Laos, 
switching from digital to offline activism is highly risky; dissent thus remains in the 
form of hashtags online. 
In contrast, in the Philippines – where Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs has 
killed tens of thousands – the Thai protests inspired an offline gathering against 
his anti-terror law of June 2020. The focus was the mistreatment of Reina Mae Asis 
Nasino – an activist arrested under this law, jailed while pregnant, and separated 
from her child soon after the latter’s birth. For some Philippine dissidents, the Thai 
protests reminded them of what happened with the Arab Spring and that there re-
mains hope for democratic change. Similarly, Indonesian activists looked to the 
Thai protests when resisting the Omnibus Law proposed by President Jodo Widodo 
in 2020 to relax 79 of the country’s business, labour, and environmental laws. As 
Indonesian protests spiralled into vandalism, activists there hoped that they could 
follow the Thai model of peaceful protest (Chia 2020). 
As Taiwan and Hong Kong are a part of the #MilkTeaAlliance, activists from the 
two countries sometimes meet with Taiwan-based students from Malaysia, Singa-
pore, and Thailand to discuss future collaboration. Especially in Taiwan, Thai stu-
dents there formed the Taiwan Alliance for Thai Democracy, and, in parallel with 
protests in Thailand, held a series of demonstrations in Taipei which Taiwanese 
and Hong Kong activists attended in solidarity. In October 2020, Taiwanese NGOs 
and political parties held a press conference in support of Thailand’s pro-democra-
cy struggle (McCartney 2020). Meanwhile, prominent Hong Kong activist Joshua 
Wong submitted a letter to the Thai Consulate in Hong Kong to express solidarity 
with the Thai movements. Beijing took note of this transnational network, but has 
not (yet) responded substantively.
As the latest member of the #MilkTeaAlliance, Myanmar’s anti-coup protesters 
are in synergy with the Thai movements. Protesters there adopt the three-finger 
salute that earlier appeared in the Thai protests. Several online and offline tactics 
resonate with those of Thai activists last year, including the use of #WhatsHappen-
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ingInMyanmar, the translation of protest leaflets into different languages, and the 
incorporation of pop icons, humour, and LGBTQI symbolism into protest banners. 
For many Myanmar activists, what happened in Hong Kong and Thailand influ-
ence their protest repertoires (Reuters 2021). But the inspiration is mutual. For 
Thais, the latest coup in Myanmar is a horrendous revisiting of their own previous 
experiences therewith – thus prompting solidarity protests together with Myanmar 
students and workers living in Thailand on 1 and 10 February 2021. Despite having 
lost momentum, the anti-establishment movements in Thailand have recently been 
reinvigorated thanks to civil resistance in Myanmar. 
A Chance for a “Southeast Asian Spring”?
Southeast Asia is at a crossroads. Thailand’s 2020 protests might have showcased 
the possibilities of pushback against autocratic repression, but whether they will 
catalyse democratisation in the region, in the sense of a “Southeast Asian Spring,” is 
an entirely different ballgame. This depends on the ability of human agency to over-
come the structural factors nurturing anti-democratic propensities in Southeast 
Asia. These include weak state capacities, legacies of past authoritarian regimes and 
developmental-state trajectories, deepening economic inequality, political, ethnic, 
and religious polarisation conducive to weak social cohesion and unresolved armed 
conflicts, the entrenchment of predatory elites, and low public support for demo-
cratic institutions and values. The persistence of these structural predicaments 
has effectively undone the grassroots-driven democratisation that transformed the 
Philippines in 1986, Thailand in 1992, Indonesia in 1998, and Malaysia in 2018, 
while precluding similar processes from occurring in intractable autocracies such 
as Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. 
Overcoming such challenges is an immense task, potentially dimming the pros-
pects of bottom-up democratic transformation. Recognising this difficulty, however, 
does not imply the improbability of addressing some of these issues detrimental to 
democratic sustainability. Civil society can ignite democratic change through stra-
tegic reconfigurations that create broad-based buy-in for democratic institutions. 
They would need to link democratic aspirations to questions of economic redistri-
bution, governance, and security, discursive fields largely dominated by autocratic 
regimes. Ultimately, strategic innovations would induce a structural shift in power 
relations between deep-rooted autocratic actors and pro-democracy civil society. 
International Support for Regional Solidarity
Thailand is a test case for civic pushback against autocratic repression in Southeast 
Asia. European policymakers, aid agencies, and political foundations can play a role 
in fostering a grassroots network of regional solidarity in different ways. First, Eu-
ropean actors could work with Asian organisations that have already supported civil 
societies in the region to buttress a regional alliance that effectively counters repres-
sion. The #MilkTeaAlliance described earlier is a promising example of a pan-Asian 
democracy initiative. Originating on Twitter, #MilkTeaAlliance is still lacking off-
line infrastructures that would concretise cross-border pushbacks against an event 
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of repression in the region – beyond mere social media campaigns and sporadic 
solidarity protests. Meanwhile, academic and NGO networks facilitated by South 
Korea and Taiwan provide critical resources for grassroots movements’ responses 
to autocratic crackdowns. Bridging these formal networks with informal – often ad 
hoc – civic movements such as those in Thailand and, currently, in Myanmar, how-
ever, requires better coordination and most importantly a common vision. 
European policymakers, aid agencies, political foundations, and civic organisa-
tions could help address these challenges by facilitating a cross-group, cross-na-
tional platform. They can share European experiences and expertise as to the ideal 
contours of a regional civic front that in the past has effectively counteracted auto-
cratic encroachment. At the same time, in avoiding autocratic backlashes against 
what can be interpreted as “Western meddling,” support should appear less politi-
cally charged than classic international democracy-promotion. Capacity-building 
activities that focus on, for example, civic education, environmental protection, 
gender justice, and digital governance can serve to bring together civic society ac-
tors in Southeast Asia without alarming the ruling regimes. This is to carve out a 
safe space that allows Southeast Asian civic groups to exchange strategic insights 
and tactical knowledge, forge a regional network, and work together on a blueprint 
for concrete regional responses to autocratic repression. 
Despite the importance of pushing back against shrinking civic space, any long-
term solution will necessitate enlarging the democratic space: thus the making of a 
Southeast Asian Spring. European support for regional solidarity needs to be more 
proactive and holistic. Engagement with civil society should be extended to oppo-
sitional political parties, business sectors, and moderate regime actors willing to 
form a broad-based coalition for democratic change.
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Civil society has been facing increasing pressure around the world in recent years. 
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